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Abstract—Given a large population, it is an intensive task
to gather individual preferences over a set of alternatives and
arrive at an aggregate or collective preference of the population.
We show that social network underlying the population can
be harnessed to accomplish this task effectively, by sampling
preferences of a small subset of representative nodes. We first
develop a Facebook app to create a dataset consisting of
preferences of nodes and the underlying social network, using
which, we develop models that capture how preferences are
distributed among nodes in a typical social network. We hence
propose an appropriate objective function for the problem of
selecting best representative nodes. We devise two algorithms,
namely, Greedy-min which provides a performance guarantee
for a wide class of popular voting rules, and Greedy-sum
which exhibits excellent performance in practice. We compare
the performance of these proposed algorithms against random-
polling and popular centrality measures, and provide a detailed
analysis of the obtained results. Our analysis suggests that
selecting representatives using social network information is
advantageous for aggregating preferences related to personal
topics (e.g., lifestyle), while random polling with a reasonable
sample size is good enough for aggregating preferences related
to social topics (e.g., government policies).
Index Terms—Social networks, preference aggregation, repre-
sentatives selection, sampling, elections.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are several scenarios such as elections, opinion polls,
public project initiatives, funding decisions, etc., where a
population (society) faces a number of alternatives. In such
scenarios, the population’s collective preference over the given
alternatives is of importance. Ideally, one would want to obtain
the preferences of all the individuals in the population and
aggregate them so as to represent the population’s preference.
These individuals can be termed as ‘voters’ in this context.
This process of computing an aggregate preference over a set
of alternatives, given individual preferences, is termed prefer-
ence aggregation (a well-studied topic in social choice theory).
It is generally assumed that the preferences of all the voters are
known. In real-world scenarios, however, it may not be feasible
to gather the individual preferences of all the voters owing
to factors such as their lack of interest to provide prompt,
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truthful, well-informed, and well-thought out preferences over
the given alternatives. As an immediate example, consider
a company desiring to launch a future product based on its
customer feedback. However, very few customers might be
willing to devote the needed effort to promptly provide a useful
feedback. Further, even if we manage to gather preferences of
all the voters, obtaining an aggregate preference may not be
feasible owing to computational issues.
Owing to the difficulty involved in obtaining individual
preferences of an entire population and in computing the
aggregate preference, an attractive approach would be to select
a subset of voters whose preferences reflect the population’s
preferences, and hence incentivize only those voters to report
their preferences. We refer to these voters as representatives.
To determine such representatives, this work proposes ideas for
harnessing additional information regarding the population of
voters: the underlying social network. It has been established
based on a large number of empirical evidences over the years
that, there is a significant correlation between the preferences
of voters and the underlying social network; this can be
attributed to the homophily phenomenon [1]. There have been
several efforts for modeling homophily and strength of ties in
social networks [2], [3]. The social network and the involved
tie strengths (similarities among nodes) could thus give addi-
tional information regarding the individual preferences.
In the context of social networks, we use ‘nodes’ to repre-
sent voters and ‘neighbors’ to represent their connections.
A. Overview of the Problem and Solution Approach
We now informally describe the problem addressed in this
paper. Given a population and a topic (such as political party)
for which alternatives need to be ranked, let pA be the col-
lective (or aggregate) preference of the population computed
using a certain voting (or aggregation) rule. Note that unless
we have the preferences of the nodes in the population, pA
is indeterminate. Suppose instead of obtaining preferences of
all the nodes, we obtain preferences of only a subset of nodes
and compute their collective preference, say pB . The problem
we study is to find a subset of a certain cardinality k such
that pB is as close as possible to pA. For determining how
close pB is to pA, it is required that we deduce pA (since it
is unknown to us). To do this, we need an underlying model
for deducing the preferences of nodes, with which we can
compute an estimate of pA using the voting rule. Motivated
by the correlation that exists between the preferences of nodes
and the underlying social network, we propose a model that
captures how preferences are distributed in the network. Such
a model would enable us to deduce the individual preferences
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2of all the nodes, with the knowledge of preferences of a subset
of nodes. With such a model in place, we would be able to
estimate how close pB is to pA, and also find a subset of nodes
for which this ‘closeness’ is optimal.
The problem of determining the best representatives can
thus be classified into two subproblems: (a) deducing how
preferences are distributed in the population and (b) finding a
subset of nodes whose collective preference closely resembles
or approximates the collective preference of the population.
This paper addresses these two subproblems.
B. Preliminaries
We now provide some preliminaries on preference aggrega-
tion, required throughout the paper. Given a set of alternatives,
we refer to a ranked list of alternatives as a preference
and the multiset consisting of the individual preferences as
preference profile. For example, if the set of alternatives is
{X,Y, Z} and node i prefers Y the most and X the least,
i’s preference is written as (Y, Z,X)i. Suppose node j’s
preference is (X,Y, Z)j , then the preference profile of the
population {i, j} is {(Y,Z,X), (X,Y, Z)}. A widely used
measure of dissimilarity between two preferences is Kendall-
Tau distance which counts the number of pairwise inversions
with respect to the alternatives. Given r alternatives, the
normalized Kendall-Tau distance can be obtained by dividing
this distance by
(r
2
)
, the maximum distance between any two
preferences on r alternatives. For example, the Kendall-Tau
distance between preferences (X,Y, Z) and (Y, Z,X) is 2,
since two pairs, {X,Y } and {X,Z}, are inverted between
them. The normalized Kendall-Tau distance is 2/
(3
2
)
.
An aggregation rule takes a preference profile as input and
outputs the aggregate preference, which aims to reflect the
collective opinion of all the nodes. We do not assume any
tie-breaking rule in order to avoid bias towards any particular
alternative while determining the aggregate preference. So an
aggregation rule may output multiple aggregate preferences
(that is, aggregation rule is a correspondence). A survey of
voting rules and their extensions to aggregation rules, can be
found in [4]. We consider several aggregation rules for our
study, namely, Bucklin, Smith set, Borda, Veto, Minmax (pair-
wise opposition), Dictatorship, Random Dictatorship, Schulze,
Plurality, Kemeny, and Copeland.
C. Relevant Work
This work is at the interface of social network analysis
and voting theory. Specifically, we adapt a model of opinion
dynamics in social networks, so as to model how preferences
are distributed in a network. Using the adapted model, we
sample a subset of nodes which could act as representatives
of the network. The research topics of relevance to our work
are thus, relation between social networks and voting, models
of opinion dynamics, and network sampling. We now present
the relevant literature and position our work.
1) Social networks and voting: The pioneering Columbia
and Michigan political voting research [5] emphasizes on
the importance of the underlying social network. It has been
observed that the social network has higher impact on one’s
political party choice than background attributes like class or
ethnicity [6] as well as religion, education, and social sta-
tus [7]. It has been argued that interactions in social networks
have a strong, though often overlooked, influence on voting,
since interactions allow an individual to gather information
beyond personal resource constraints [8], [9]. The impact of
social networks has also been compared with that of mass
media communication with respect to voting choices, where it
is observed that social discussions outweigh the media effect
[10], and that both the effects should be studied together [11].
On the other hand, it has also been argued via a maximum
likelihood approach to political voting, that it is optimal to
ignore the network structure [12]. It is also not uncommon to
observe highly accurate predictions about election outcomes
by soliciting opinions of randomly chosen voters.
There are supporting arguments for both views (regarding
whether or not social network plays a role in voting); so
one of the goals of this work is to identify conditions under
which social network visibly plays a role. As we will see,
our work suggests that social network and homophily indeed
play a critical role in voting related to personal topics (such as
lifestyle). However, for voting related to social topics (such as
government policies), factors which are external to the network
and common to all nodes (such as mass media channels) could
play a strong role, which would allow ignoring social network
if the sample size is reasonable.
2) Models of opinion dynamics: Opinion dynamics is the
process of development of opinions in a population over
time, primarily owing to the information exchanged through
interactions. Several models of opinion dynamics in networks
have been studied in the literature [1], [13], [14], such
as DeGroot, Friedkin-Johnsen, Independent Cascade, Linear
Threshold, etc. Since opinions and networks are key factors
in opinion dynamics as well as our setting, it is natural to
consider the applicability of opinion dynamics techniques to
our setting.
One of the primary factors that distinguishes our setting
from opinion dynamics is that, the edge weights in opinion dy-
namics represent influence weights or probabilities, while the
edge weights in our setting represent probability distributions
over similarity values (homophilic tie strengths). So if one
intends to use the models of opinion dynamics for the problem
under consideration, they need to be appropriately adapted.
In this paper, we propose an adaptation of the Independent
Cascade model; instead of deducing the probability of a node
getting influenced (given edge probabilities and a subset of
nodes which are already influenced), we deduce the preference
of a node (given homophilic tie strengths and the preferences
of a subset of nodes).
3) Network sampling: A taxonomy of different graph sam-
pling objectives and approaches is provided in [15]. Problems
in developing a general theory of network sampling are dis-
cussed in [16]. A discussion on which sampling method to use
and how small the sample size can be, is provided in [17]; there
it is also experimentally observed that simple uniform random
3node selection performs surprisingly well. The problem of
finding a subset of users to statistically represent the original
social network has also been studied [18], [19].
Our setting principally deviates from the existing literature
in that, as stated earlier, we consider edges having probability
distributions over similarity values (instead of weights or prob-
abilities). Moreover, we address the problem of sampling best
representative nodes based on a ranked list of alternatives, and
undertake a study to determine the performance of sampling-
based approach for preference aggregation with respect to a
number of voting rules.
Furthermore, the problem of node selection based on ranked
list of alternatives has been studied by utilizing the attributes of
voters and alternatives [20], however, the underlying network
is ignored.
D. Our Contributions
Our specific contributions are as follows.
• We develop a Facebook app to create a dataset consisting
of the preferences of nodes over a variety of topics and
the underlying social network. With this dataset, we pro-
pose and validate a number of simple yet faithful models
with the aim of capturing how preferences are distributed
among nodes in a social network, while having probabilistic
information regarding tie similarities.
• We formulate an objective function for the problem of
determining best representative nodes in a social network,
and hence propose a robustness property for aggregation
rules to justify appropriateness of two surrogate objective
functions for computational purpose.
• We provide a guarantee on the performance of one of the
algorithms (Greedy-min), and study desirable properties of
a second algorithm (Greedy-sum) which exhibits excellent
performance in practice. We compare these algorithms
with the popular random polling method and well-known
centrality measures over a number of voting rules, and
analyze the results.
• We present insights on the effectiveness of our approach
with respect to personal and social topics.
We believe the results in this paper offer a rigorous model
for capturing spread of preferences in a social network, and
present effective methods for sampling-based preference ag-
gregation using social networks.
II. MODELING SPREAD OF PREFERENCES IN A
SOCIAL NETWORK
In this section, we first introduce the idea of modeling the
spread of preferences in a social network, with an analogy
to modeling opinion dynamics. We then describe the dataset
created through our Facebook app and hence develop a number
of simple and intuitive yet faithful models for deducing the
spread of preferences across the nodes in a social network.
Here we use the term ‘spread’ to indicate distribution, not
diffusion (we do not use the term ‘distribution’ of preferences
since we frequently use it in the context of probability distribu-
tions). We treat an edge as representing similarity (tie strength
with respect to homophily) between two connected nodes,
and not as influence weights or probabilities as in opinion
dynamics models. The preferences of the nodes could have
resulted owing to opinion dynamics over the network, along
with external influences such as mass media channels. Our
goal here is to model the spread of these preferences while
knowing the edge weights indicating similarities.
A. Dataset for Modeling Spread of Preferences in a Social
Network
We presented a connection between the opinion dynamics
setting and our setting in Section I-C2. It is assumed while
studying opinion dynamics that the edge influence weights or
probabilities are given, using which, a model (such as Indepen-
dent Cascade and Linear Threshold) predicts the probability
with which each node would get influenced starting with a
given seed set. Alternatively, models such as DeGroot would
predict the final opinion of each node, based on the edge
influence weights which are assumed to be given. On similar
lines, for our proposed models in Section II-C, we assume
the edge similarity parameters to be given, using which we
deduce the preference of each node. It can also be viewed that,
given the edge parameters indicating homophilic tie strengths,
we aim to find preferences of all nodes such that they are
consistent with the given parameters for all edges, that is, how
preferences are distributed or spread across the nodes in the
network. These edge parameters, however, would need to be
inferred from some available data. This, again, is on similar
lines as opinion dynamics models, where the influence weights
or probabilities would be required to be inferred from some
past data.
In order to develop models for achieving the aforementioned
objectives, there was a need of a dataset that consists of
(a) preferences of nodes for a range of topics and (b) the
underlying social network. With this underlying goal, we
developed a Facebook app titled The Perfect Representer,
which asked the app users to report their preferences for 8
topics, over 5 alternatives for each topic. The topics (broadly
classified into personal and social types), their alternatives, the
network of app users, and details about dataset preprocessing,
are provided in Appendix A. Table I provides some statistics
of this dataset. Table II presents the notation used throughout
the paper.
TABLE I
STATISTICS OF THE FACEBOOK DATASET
number of nodes 844
number of edges 6129
average clustering coefficient 0.5890
number of triangles 33216
fraction of closed triangles 0.4542
diameter 13
90-percentile effective diameter 4.9
power law exponent 2.12
4TABLE II
NOTATION USED IN THE PAPER
N set of nodes in the network
E set of edges in the network
n number of nodes in the network
m number of edges in the network
r number of alternatives
P preference profile of N
d˜(x, y) distance between preferences x and y
f preference aggregation rule
i, j typical nodes in the network
d(i, j) expected distance between preferences of i and j
c(i, j) 1− d(i, j)
k desired cardinality of the representative set
M set of representatives who report their preferences
Φ(M, i) representative of node i in set M
Q profile containing unweighted preferences of M
Q′ profile containing weighted preferences of M
∆ error operator between aggregate preferences
B. Modeling Distance between Preferences of Nodes
In order to study the homophilic tie strength or similarity
between two nodes with respect to their preferences, we
use the measure of normalized Kendall-Tau distance. The
histogram of distance between preferences of most pairs of
nodes (connected as well as unconnected), over the considered
topics, followed a bell curve (most distances were clubbed
together, with few of them spread apart). As a preliminary
fit to the data, we consider Gaussian distribution since it is
a natural and most commonly observed distribution in real-
world applications. Since the range of values taken by the
distance is bounded between 0 and 1, we consider Truncated
Gaussian distribution. Furthermore, as the range of values is
discrete, we consider a discrete version of truncated Gaussian
distribution; denote it by D. The discretization can be done
in the following way. We know that when the number of
alternatives is r, the distance between consecutive discrete
values is 1/
(r
2
)
= 2r(r−1) . Let F be the cumulative distribution
function of the continuous truncated Gaussian distribution; the
value of the probability mass function of D at x can be shown
to be
F
(
min
{
x+
1
r(r − 1) , 1
})
− F
(
max
{
x− 1
r(r − 1) , 0
})
.
So for a pair of nodes {i, j}, there is an associated histogram
of normalized Kendall-Tau distances over different topics. To
this histogram, we attempt to fit distribution D using MLE,
and infer the corresponding parameters (µij and σij of the
original Gaussian distribution from which D is derived). We
use KL divergence to find the fitting error between the true
histogram obtained from the data and the fitted distribution
D. This process is run for all pairs of nodes; the resulting
histogram of KL divergences over all pairs is presented in
Figure 1. The root mean square (RMS) KL divergence for
connected as well as unconnected pairs was observed to be
0.25 with more than 90% pairs having KL divergence less
than 0.6.
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Fig. 1. Histogram of KL divergence between the normalized histograms and
the distribution D obtained using MLE for all pairs of nodes
Let the expected distance between nodes i and j with
respect to their preferences, be denoted by d(i, j). Let distance
matrix be a matrix whose cell (i, j) is d(i, j) and similarity
matrix be a matrix whose cell (i, j) is c(i, j) = 1 − d(i, j).
Following are certain statistics about d(i, j)’s over all pairs
of nodes in the obtained Facebook app data. The means (=
avg {i,j} d(i, j)) for personal, social, and both types of topics
are respectively 0.40, 0.30, 0.35, while the standard deviations
are respectively 0.12, 0.08, 0.09. (Our focus throughout this
paper will be on aggregating preferences across all topics
or issues; we provide a preliminary analysis by considering
different types of topics separately, in Section IV-E).
C. Modeling Spread of Preferences in Social Network
Recollect that the primary objective of modeling the spread
of preferences in a social network is to identify best set of
representative nodes for the entire social network. In order to
do this, we need not only the distribution of distances between
connected nodes, but also that between unconnected nodes. As
an analogy to modeling opinion dynamics as per models such
as Independent Cascade, in order to identify best set of seed
nodes for maximizing opinion diffusion, we need the influence
of a candidate set, not only on its neighbors but also on distant
nodes.
Given the preferences of a set of nodes (call it initializing
set), our models aim to deduce the possible preferences of
all the nodes in the social network. If this model is run for
several iterations, say T, with a randomized initializing set
in each iteration, we would have deduced the preferences of
nodes for these T generated (or simulated) topics (and hence
T preference profiles). This would then enable us to deduce
the distribution of distances between unconnected nodes as
well. We address each of our models as a Random Preferences
Model (RPM) since the deduced preferences and hence the
distances are randomized.
The models that we propose work iteratively (similar to
the Independent Cascade model wherein iterations correspond
to time steps). In each iteration, we partition the nodes into
two sets, namely, (1) assigned nodes which are assigned a
5Algorithm 1: A generic model for spread of preferences
in a social network
Input: Connected graph G with parameters µ, σ on its
edges, Number of generated (simulated) topics T
Output: Preference profiles for T generated topics
for t← 1 to T do
Randomly choose an initializing set of certain size s;
Assign preferences to nodes in this initializing set;
for i← 1 to n− s do
Choose an unassigned node u uniformly at random
from the set of potentially next nodes;
Assign a preference to u based on:
(i) the model under consideration and
(ii) either (a) preferences of assigned neighbors
or (b) preference of one of its assigned
neighbors chosen based on a certain criterion;
preference, and (2) unassigned nodes which are not assigned a
preference as yet. Let potentially next nodes in a given iteration
be the subset of unassigned nodes, which have at least one
neighbor in the set of assigned nodes. Starting with the nodes
in the initializing set as the only assigned nodes, a node is
chosen uniformly at random from the set of potentially next
nodes in each iteration, and is assigned a preference based on
the preferences of its assigned neighbors (neighbors belonging
to the set of assigned nodes). Algorithm 1 presents a generic
model on these lines.
Note that the preference profiles are obtained by considering
independently sampled initializing sets across iterations (ver-
sus considering the same set in models such as Independent
Cascade). Also, social networks are known to have a core-
periphery structure. Considering a random core node and a
random periphery node, the latter is more likely to deduce its
preference due to the preference of the former, than the other
way around; this is captured over iterations in Algorithm 1.
We now present a number of models as its special cases.
1) Independent Conditioning (RPM-IC): Let Pj be the
random preference to be assigned to a node j and Aj be the set
of assigned neighbors of node j. So given the preferences of
its assigned neighbors, the probability of node j being assigned
a preference pj is
P
(
Pj = pj |(Pi = pi)i∈Aj
)
=
P
(
(Pi = pi)i∈Aj |Pj = pj
)
P(Pj = pj)∑
pj
P
(
(Pi = pi)i∈Aj |Pj = pj
)
P(Pj = pj)
(Bayes’ rule)
∝ P ((Pi = pi)i∈Aj |Pj = pj)
The proportionality results since the denominator is com-
mon, and P(Pj = pj) = 1r! for all pj’s (assuming no prior
bias). Now we make a simplifying assumption of mutual
independence among the preferences of assigned neighbors of
node j, given its own preference. So the above proportionality
results in
P
(
Pj = pj |(Pi = pi)i∈Aj
) ∝ ∏
i∈Aj
P(Pi = pi|Pj = pj) (1)
The right hand term consists of factors P(Pi = pi|Pj = pj)
for each i ∈ Aj . P(Pi = pi|Pj = pj) says, given we have
assigned preference pj to j, what is the probability that i had
preference pi? We now show how to compute it. Let Dij be the
random variable corresponding to the distance between i and j
(so Dij has distribution D with values of µ, σ corresponding to
pair {i, j}). Let d˜(pi, pj) be the distance between preferences
pi and pj . So,
P (Pi = pi|Pj = pj)
= P
(
Pi = pi, Dij = d˜(pi, pj)|Pj = pj
)
(∵ given Pj , Pi ∩Dij = Pi)
= P
(
Dij = d˜(pi, pj)|Pj = pj
)
P
(
Pi = pi|Dij = d˜(pi, pj), Pj = pj
)
= P
(
Dij = d˜(pi, pj)
)
P
(
Pi = pi|Dij = d˜(pi, pj), Pj = pj
)
(2)
(∵ Dij is independent of Pj)
Here, P
(
Dij = d˜(pi, pj)
)
can be readily obtained by look-
ing at the distribution D corresponding to {i, j}. Also, as
we assume that no preference has higher priority than any
other, P
(
Pi = pi|Dij = d˜(pi, pj), Pj = pj
)
is precisely the
reciprocal of the number of preferences which are at dis-
tance d˜(pi, pj) from a given preference. This value can be
expressed in terms of distance d˜(pi, pj) and the number of
alternatives. As an example for the case of 5 alternatives, the
number of preferences which are at a normalized Kendall-
Tau distance of 0.1 (or Kendall-Tau distance of 1) from any
given preference is 4; for example, if the given preference
is (A,B,C,D,E), the 4 preferences are (B,A,C,D,E),
(A,C,B,D,E), (A,B,D,C,E), (A,B,C,E,D). It is clear
that this count is independent of the given preference.
The initializing set for this model is a singleton set chosen
uniformly at random, and is assigned a preference chosen
uniformly at random from the set of all preferences. For each
unassigned node, this model computes probabilities for each of
the r! possible preferences, by looking at the preferences of its
assigned neighbors, and hence chooses exactly one preference
based on the computed probabilities (multinomial sampling).
So the time complexity of this model for assigning preferences
for T topics is O(r!(
∑
i∈N deg(i))T) = O(r!mT), where
deg(i) is the degree of node i. Note that the initializing set
is taken to be singleton, since an initializing set consisting of
multiple nodes may lead to conflict in preferences, and hence
inconsistencies with the distributions.
2) Sampling (RPM-S): For assigning preference to an unas-
signed node j, we first choose one of its assigned neighbors i;
say its assigned preference is pi. Then we sample a value from
the discretized truncated Gaussian distribution D having the
parameters (µij , σij); say the sampled value is dˆij . Following
this, we choose a preference pj such that the Kendall Tau
distance between pi and pj , that is d˜(pi, pj), is dˆij (in case of
multiple possibilities, choose pj uniformly at random from
among these possibilities). The assigned neighbor i ∈ Aj
could be selected in multiple ways; we enlist three natural
ways which we consider in our study:
6a) Random: A node is selected uniformly at random from Aj .
This is a natural way and is immune to overfitting.
b) µ-based: A node i is selected from Aj with probability
proportional to 1 − µij (multinomial sampling). This is
consistent with the empirical belief that a node’s preference
depends more on its more similar neighbors.
c) σ-based: A node i is selected from Aj with probability
proportional to 1/σij (multinomial sampling). This is sta-
tistically a good choice because, giving lower priority to
distributions with low standard deviations may result in
extremely large errors.
Like RPM-IC, the initializing set for this model also is a
singleton set chosen uniformly at random, and is assigned a
preference chosen uniformly at random from the set of all
preferences. For each unassigned node, this model selects an
assigned neighbor in one of the above ways, samples a distance
value from the corresponding distribution, and chooses a
preference uniformly at random from the set of preferences
which are at that distance from the preference of the selected
assigned neighbor. So the time complexity of this model for
assigning preferences for T topics is O(r!(
∑
i∈N deg(i))T) =
O(r!mT).
3) Duplicating (RPM-D): In this model, node j is assigned
a preference by duplicating the preference of its most similar
assigned neighbor. This model pushes the similarity between
a node and its most similar assigned neighbor to the extreme
extent that, the preference to be assigned to the former is not
just similar to the latter, but is exactly its copy due to imitation.
Here, if the initializing set is a singleton, all nodes would
have the same preference (since the graph is assumed to be
connected). A small-sized initializing set also would lead to
very few distinct preferences. So as a heuristic, the initializing
set for this model is a connected set of certain size s which
is obtained using the following iterative approach: start with
a node chosen uniformly at random and then continue adding
a new node to the set uniformly at random, from among
the nodes that are connected to at least one node in the
set. In our experiments, we choose s itself to be uniformly
at random from {1, . . . , d√ne} (similar to the information
diffusion setting where d√ne is usually a good heuristic upper
bound for the size of the seed set). The nodes in this initializing
set are assigned preferences based on RPM-IC. The time
complexity of this model for assigning preferences for T topics
is O((
∑
i∈N deg(i))T) = O(mT).
4) Random (RPM-R): In this model, preferences are as-
signed randomly to all the nodes without considering the
distribution of distances from their neighbors, that is, without
taking the social network effect into account. This model
can be refined based on some known bias in preferences,
for instance, there may be a prior distribution on preferences
owing to common external effects such as mass media. Its
time complexity for assigning the preferences for T topics is
O(nT).
5) Mean Similarity Model - Shortest Path Based
(MSM-SP): Unlike the models discussed so far, this model
does not deduce the spread of preferences in a social network.
TABLE III
A PARTIAL VIEW OF TABLE T5
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50


dx
dy
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.00
0.17 0.26 0.33 0.42 0.50 0.10
0.32 0.37 0.43 0.50 0.20
0.40 0.45 0.50 0.30
0.47 0.50 0.40
0.50 0.50
Instead, it deduces the mean similarity between any pair of
nodes, given the mean similarities of connected nodes.
Recall that cell (i, j) of a distance matrix contains d(i, j),
the expected distance between preferences of nodes i and j.
We initialize all values in this matrix to 0 for i = j and
to 1 (the upper bound on distance) for any unconnected pair
{i, j}. In the case of a connected pair {i, j}, the value d(i, j) is
initialized to the actual observed expected distance (this value
is known from the edge parameters indicating homophilic tie
strength). Following the initialization of the distance matrix,
the next step is to update it.
Consider nodes (i, v, j) where we know the expected dis-
tances d(v, i) and d(v, j), and we wish to find d(i, j) via
node v. Given the preference of node v and dx = d(v, i),
let the preference of node i be chosen uniformly at random
from the set of preferences that are at a distance η from the
preference of node v, where η is drawn from distribution D
with mean dx (and some standard deviation). Similarly, given
dy = d(v, j), let the preference of node j be obtained. Using
this procedure, the distance between the obtained preferences
of nodes i and j via v over several iterations and varying
values of standard deviations, was observed to follow a bell
curve; so we again approximate this distribution by D. Let the
corresponding expected distance constitute the cell (dx, dy) of
a table, say Tr, where r is the number of alternatives (for the
purpose of forming a table, we consider only finite number of
values of dx, dy). It is clear that this distance is independent
of the actual preference of node v.
We empirically observe that Tr is different from Tr′ for
r 6= r′. Following are the general properties of Tr:
• Tr(dy, dx) = Tr(dx, dy)
• Tr(1− dx, dy) = Tr(dx, 1− dy) = 1− Tr(dx, dy)
• Tr(1− dx, 1− dy) = Tr(dx, dy)
As the topics of our app had 5 alternatives, we obtain the
table T5 for any pair {dx, dy}. In order to consider finite
number of values of dx, dy for forming the table, we only
account for values that are multiples of 0.01 (and also round
every entry in Tr to the nearest multiple of 0.01). Table III
presents a partial view of T5 which can be completed using
the general properties of Tr enlisted above; we present dx, dy
in multiples of 0.10 for brevity. Now the next question is to
find d(i, j) for any pair {i, j}. In order to provide a fit to the
distances obtained from the dataset, we initialize the distance
matrix as explained in the beginning of this subsection (while
rounding every value to the nearest multiple of 0.01) and
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with the following update rule:
if d(v, i) +©r d(v, j) < d(i, j) then d(i, j) = d(v, i) +©r d(v, j),
where we define operator +©r as follows:
dx +©r dy =
{
Tr(dx, dy), if dx ≤ 0.5 and dy ≤ 0.5
max{dx, dy}, if dx > 0.5 or dy > 0.5
The corresponding similarity matrix is obtained by assigning
1− d(i, j) to its cell (i, j). The two cases while defining +©r
ensure that d(i, j) via v is assigned a value which is at least
max{d(v, i), d(v, j)}. This is to guarantee the convergence of
the adapted all pairs shortest path algorithm.
The time complexity of deducing the mean distances be-
tween all pairs of nodes using MSM-SP is dominated by the
all pairs shortest path algorithm, O(n2 log n+ nm) using Di-
jkstra’s algorithm over all source nodes, where m is generally
small owing to sparsity of social networks.
Remark 1. We have already seen the time complexities of the
models (other than MSM-SP) for assigning preferences for T
topics; the time complexity of deducing the mean distances
between all pairs of nodes after that, is O(Grn2T), where
Gr is the time complexity of computing the distance between
two preferences (for instance, Gr is O(r2) for Kendall-Tau
distance, O(r) for Spearman Footrule distance).
D. Validating the Models
To validate a given model, we generated the preferences of
all the nodes for T = 104 simulated topics. Following this, we
could get the distances between preferences of every pair of
nodes in terms of normalized Kendall-Tau distance. In order to
measure the error err({i, j}) of this deduced model distribution
against the distribution D with the actual values of µij and σij
for a particular pair of nodes {i, j}, we used the following
methods:
1) Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, a standard way of mea-
suring error between actual and model distributions,
2) Earth Mover’s distance (EMD), another measure of the
distance between two probability distributions,
3) Absolute difference between the means of these two dis-
tributions, since some of our algorithms would be working
with the distribution means,
4) Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Test, a non-parametric test
to compare the obtained distribution with the expected
probability distribution (we use significance level 0.05).
For methods 1-3, we measured the total error over all
pairs of nodes as the root mean square (RMS) error, that
is,
√
avg {i,j}[err({i, j})]2. Figure 2 provides a comparison
among the models under study, with respect to their errors
and running times. (Note that RMS KL divergence and EMD
are not applicable for MSM-SP). RPM-IC gave the least errors
but at the cost of extremely high running time. RPM-D and
RPM-R ran fast but their errors were in a higher range. RPM-
S showed a good balance between the errors and running
time; the way of choosing the assigned neighbor (µ-based,
σ-based, or random) did not show significant effect on its
results. MSM-SP was observed to be the best model when
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Fig. 2. Comparison among the considered models when run for 104 iterations
(or simulated topics)
TABLE IV
FRACTION OF PAIRS FAILING CHI-SQUARE GOODNESS OF FIT TEST
RPM-IC RPM-S RPM-D RPM-R MSM-SP
0.001 0.02 0.96 0.99 NA
our objective was to deduce the mean distances between all
pairs of nodes, and not the preferences themselves. With 5
alternatives, the normalized Kendall-Tau distances can take 11
possible values {0, 0.1, . . . , 0.9, 1}. The upper critical value
of chi-square distribution with 10 degrees of freedom for
significance level 0.05 is 18.307. The test is failed if the chi-
square test statistic exceeds this value.
The chi-square statistic is high (punishes heavily) if the
deduced distribution allots non-negligible probability to values
which are allotted negligible probability by the actual distri-
bution. This was the case for a large fraction of pairs when
using RPM-D and for over 99% of pairs when using RPM-R,
thus leading to high fractions of failures.
Remark 2. Owing to a good balance between accuracy and
efficiency, RPM-S can be justified to be used for deducing the
preferences of nodes in a social network, with the knowledge of
preferences of a subset of nodes. However, if we need only the
deduced edge similarities for all pairs of nodes without having
to deduce the actual preferences, MSM-SP is a promising
model.
As explained in Section I-A, a model that could deduce the
preferences of all the nodes, would allow us to deduce the
actual aggregate preference of the network. This would hence
allow us to estimate how closely the aggregate preference
obtained using a set of representative nodes resembles the
actual aggregate preference. With an estimate of closeness
associated with every candidate representative set, it would
now be possible to determine a representative set with the
closest resemblance. The focus of the following sections will
be on formulating an objective function that quantifies this
closeness, and hence developing algorithms for determining
the best representative set.
8III. THE SAMPLING-BASED PREFERENCE
AGGREGATION PROBLEM
Given a network with a set of nodes N and an aggregation
rule f , our objective is to choose a set of representative nodes
M ⊆ N of certain cardinality k, and aggregate their prefer-
ences to arrive at an aggregate preference that is ‘close enough’
to the aggregate preference of N using f , in expectation
(in expectation, owing to the stochastic nature of the edge
similarities). We now formalize this problem.
Let the expected distance between a set S ⊆ N and a node
i ∈ N be
d(S, i) = min
j∈S
d(j, i) (3)
We call d(S, i) as the ‘expected’ distance since d(j, i) is the
expected distance between nodes j and i with respect to their
preferences. Since d(i, i) = 0,∀i ∈ N , we have d(S, j) =
0,∀j ∈ S. Let
Φ(S, i) ∼U arg min
j∈S
d(j, i) (4)
be a node chosen uniformly at random from the set of nodes
in S that are closest in expectation to node i in terms of
preferences. We say that Φ(S, i) represents node i in set S. In
other words, Φ(S, i) is the unique representative of i in S.
A. Aggregating Preferences of Representative Nodes
Recall that preference profile is a multiset containing prefer-
ences of the nodes. Let the preference profile of the population
N be P and that of the selected representative set M be
Q. Suppose M = {i, j} where j represents, say ten nodes
including itself, while i represents one node (only itself). If
the preferences are aggregated by feeding Q to aggregation
rule f , the aggregate preference f(Q) so obtained may not
reflect the preferences of the population, in general, owing
to the asymmetry in importance of the selected nodes. So to
capture this asymmetry, their preferences must be weighted.
In our approach, the weight given to the preference of a node
is precisely the number of nodes that it represents.
Let Q′ be the preference profile obtained by replacing every
node’s preference in P by its uniquely chosen representative’s
preference. So, k = |M | = |Q| ≤ |Q′| = |P | = |N | = n.
In our approach, the weight of a representative implies the
number of nodes it represents or equivalently, the number of
times its preference appears in the new preference profile.
So in the above example, the new profile Q′ consists of
ten preferences of j and one of i. Thus we aggregate the
preferences of selected nodes using f(Q′).
So the problem under consideration can be viewed as a
setting where given certain nodes representing a population,
every node in the population is asked to choose one among
them as its representative; now the representatives vote on
behalf of the nodes who chose them.
B. A Measure of ‘Close Enough’
Now given k, our objective is to select a set of nodes
M such that |M | = k, who report their preferences such
that, in expectation, the error incurred in using the aggregate
preference, say f(R), obtained by aggregating the preferences
of the nodes in M (in an unweighted manner if R = Q or in
a weighted manner if R = Q′) instead of f(P ) obtained by
aggregating the preferences of the nodes in N , is minimized.
Note that an aggregation rule f may not output a unique
aggregate preference, that is, f is a correspondence. So the
aggregation rule f on the preferences of the entire population
outputs f(P ) which is a set of preferences.
If f(R) is a set of multiple preferences, we need to have a
way to determine how close it is to f(P ). For this purpose,
we propose an extension of Kendall-Tau distance for sets of
preferences. Now, since f(P ) is generally not known and all
preferences in f(R) are equivalent in our view, we choose a
preference from f(R) uniformly at random and see how far
we are from the actual aggregate preference, in expectation.
In order to claim that a chosen preference in f(R) is a good
approximation, it suffices to show that it is close to at least
one preference in f(P ). Also, as any preference y in f(R) is
chosen uniformly at random, we define the error incurred in
using f(R) instead of f(P ) as
f(P ) ∆ f(R) = Ey∼Uf(R)
[
min
x∈f(P )
d˜(x, y)
]
(5)
where d˜(x, y) is the distance between preferences x and y
in terms of the same distance measure as d(·, ·) (normalized
Kendall-Tau distance in our case). Notice that in general,
f(P ) ∆ f(R) 6= f(R) ∆ f(P ). For instance, if f(P ) =
{pA, pB}, f(R) = {pA}, the error is zero since we have ob-
tained an aggregate preference that is among the actual aggre-
gate preferences. On the other hand, if f(P ) = {pA}, f(R) =
{pA, pB}, there is a half probability of choosing pA which is
consistent with the actual aggregate preference, however, there
is a half probability of choosing pB which is inconsistent; this
results in f(P ) ∆ f(R) = 12 d˜(pB , pA). Note that ∆ can be
defined in several other ways depending on the application or
the case we are interested in (worst, best, average, etc.). In this
paper, we use the definition of ∆ as given in Equation (5).
Recall that the distance between a pair of nodes is drawn
from distribution D with the corresponding parameters, so
the realized values for different topics would be different in
general. The value f(P ) ∆ f(R) can be obtained for every
topic and hence the expected error E[f(P ) ∆ f(R)] can be
computed by averaging the values over all topics. It can be
easily seen that E[f(P ) ∆ f(R)] ∈ [0, 1]. Now our objective
is to find a set M such that E[f(P ) ∆ f(R)] is minimized.
C. An Abstraction of the Problem
For aggregation rule f , we define the objective function
to be F(M) = 1 − E[f(P ) ∆ f(R)] with the objective of
finding a set M that maximizes this value. However, even if
M is given, computing F(M) is computationally intensive
for several aggregation rules and furthermore, hard for rules
such as Kemeny. It can be seen that F(·) is not monotone
for non-dictatorial aggregation rules (the reader is referred
to Figure 3 for the non-monotonic plots of Greedy-sum and
Degree-cen algorithms since in a run of these algorithms, a
set of certain cardinality is a superset of any set having a
smaller cardinality). It can also be checked empirically that
9F(·) is neither submodular nor supermodular. Even for simple
non-dictatorial aggregation rules, it is not clear if one could
efficiently find a set M that maximizes F(·), within any
constant approximation factor. This motivates us to propose
an approach that finds set M agnostic to the aggregation rule
being used. To this end, we propose a property for preference
aggregation rules, weak insensitivity.
Definition 1 (weak insensitivity property). A preference ag-
gregation rule satisfies weak insensitivity property under a
distance measure and an error operator between aggregate
preferences ∆, if and only if for any d, a change of ηi ≤ d
in the preferences of all i, results in a change of at most d
in the aggregate preference. That is, ∀d,
ηi ≤ d , ∀i ∈ N =⇒ f(P ) ∆ f(P ′) ≤ d
where P ′ is the preference profile of voters after deviations.
We call it ‘weak’ insensitivity property because it allows
‘limited’ change in the aggregate preference (strong insensi-
tivity can be thought of as a property that allows no change).
This is potentially an important property that an aggregation
rule should satisfy as it is a measure of its robustness in some
sense. It is clear that under normalized Kendall-Tau distance
measure and ∆ as defined in Equation (5), an aggregation
rule that outputs a random preference does not satisfy weak
insensitivity property as it fails the criterion for any d < 1,
whereas dictatorship rule that outputs the preference of a
single voter satisfies the property trivially. For our purpose,
we propose a weaker form of this property, which we call
expected weak insensitivity.
Definition 2 (expected weak insensitivity property). A pref-
erence aggregation rule satisfies expected weak insensitivity
property under a distribution, a distance measure, and an error
operator between aggregate preferences ∆, if and only if for
any µd, a change of ηi in the preferences of all i, where
ηi is drawn from the distribution with mean δi ≤ µd and
any permissible standard deviation σd, results in an expected
change of at most µd in the aggregate preference. That is,
∀µd, ∀ permissible σd,
δi ≤ µd , ∀i ∈ N =⇒ E[f(P ) ∆ f(P ′)] ≤ µd (6)
where P ′ is the preference profile of voters after deviations.
Note that in E[f(P ) ∆ f(P ′)], the expectation is over the
varying modified preferences of the voters (since ηi’s vary
across instances and also, there are multiple preferences at a
distance of ηi from any given preference, in general). In this
paper, we study expected weak insensitivity property under
distribution D, normalized Kendall-Tau distance, and ∆ as
defined in Equation (5). For distribution D with µd ∈ [0, 1],
the permissible range of σd depends on µd. This range is wider
for intermediate values of µd and shortens as we move towards
the extremes. In any case, the permissible range for σd cannot
exceed 1√
12
≈ 0.28 (value at which the truncated Gaussian
becomes a Uniform distribution), while for µd ∈ {0, 1}, the
permissible σd = 0 (since a Gaussian distribution truncated in
[0, 1] with any non-zero standard deviation cannot have 0 or
1 as the mean).
TABLE V
TYPICAL FRACTIONS OF SIMULATION RUNS IN WHICH THE CRITERION
FOR EXPECTED WEAK INSENSITIVITY WAS SATISFIED BY VARIOUS
AGGREGATION RULES UNDER DISTRIBUTION D, NORMALIZED
KENDALL-TAU DISTANCE, AND ∆ AS DEFINED
Dictatorship 1.00 Smith set .998 Schulze .997
Copeland .97 Plurality .95 Borda .92
Minmax .87 Kemeny .85 Bucklin .82 Veto .69
Remark 3. We conducted extensive simulations for inves-
tigating empirical satisfaction of the expected weak insen-
sitivity property by the considered aggregation rules under
distribution D, normalized Kendall-Tau distance, and ∆ as
defined in Equation (5). The simulations considered values of
r = 3, . . . , 7, n = 100, 200, . . . , 1000, different distributions
on the voter preferences, discrete values of µd separated by
1/
(r
2
)
(the finest resolution for the given r), and discrete
values of σd separated by 10% of the maximum permissible
value for the corresponding µd. For any fixed preference
profile, Table V presents typical fractions of simulation runs
in which Criterion (6) was satisfied, by various aggregation
rules. Dictatorship rule always satisfied the criterion, whereas
Smith set and Schulze rules satisfied it almost always. It was,
however, violated by Veto rule for a large fraction of simulation
runs. For all other considered rules, if (6) was violated, it
was usually for the lowest values of µd. Furthermore, in most
cases, the extent of violation was not very significant. So if µd
is not very small, these rules could be assumed to satisfy the
expected weak insensitivity property for practical purposes.
Lemma 1. Given a distance measure and a ∆, with a pref-
erence aggregation rule satisfying expected weak insensitivity
property under distribution D, if the expected distance between
every node and the representative set M is at most d ∈ [0, 1],
then the expected error incurred in using f(Q′) instead of
f(P ) is at most d. That is, for d ∈ [0, 1],
d(M, i) ≤ d , ∀i ∈ N =⇒ E[f(P ) ∆ f(Q′)] ≤ d
Proof. In the preference profile P of all nodes, the preference
of any node i ∈ N is replaced by the preference of its repre-
sentative node p = Φ(M, i) to obtain Q′. From Equations (3),
(4), and the hypothesis, we have d(p, i) ≤ d.
Since in P , preference of every i is replaced by that of the
corresponding p to obtain Q′, and distance between i and p is
distributed according to distribution D with mean d(p, i) and
some standard deviation σd, the above is equivalent to node i
deviating its preference by some value which is drawn from
distribution D with mean d(p, i) = d(M, i). So we can map
these variables to the corresponding variables in Equation (6)
as follows: δi = d(M, i) ∀i, µd = d, and P ′ = Q′. Also,
recall that in E[f(P ) ∆ f(P ′)], the expectation is over varying
modified preferences of the nodes, while in E[f(P ) ∆ f(Q′)],
the expectation is over varying preferences of the nodes’
representatives in M with respect to different topics (and hence
preferences) of the nodes. These are equivalent given P ′ = Q′.
As this argument is valid for any permissible σd, the result
follows.
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So under the proposed model and for aggregation rules
satisfying the expected weak insensitivity property, Lemma 1
establishes a relation between (a) the closeness of the chosen
representative set to the population in terms of expected
distance and (b) the error incurred in the aggregate preference
if that set is chosen as the representative set. We now return
to our goal of abstracting the problem of determining a
representative set, by proposing an approach that is agnostic
to the aggregation rule being used.
D. Objective Functions in the Abstracted Problem
Recall that c(·, ·) = 1− d(·, ·). Our objective is now to find
a set of critical nodes M that maximizes a certain objective
function, with the hope of minimizing E[f(P ) ∆ f(R)] where
R = Q′ in our case. As the aggregation rule is anonymous,
in order to ensure that the approach works well, even for
rules such as random dictatorship, the worst-case objective
function for the problem under consideration, representing
least expected similarity, is
ρ(S) = min
i∈N
c(S, i) (7)
The above is equivalent to: maxi∈N d(S, i) = 1− ρ(S). Thus
d = 1 − ρ(S) in Lemma 1, and so this objective function
offers a guarantee on E[f(P ) ∆ f(Q′)] for aggregation rules
satisfying the expected weak insensitivity property. We will
provide a detailed analysis for the performance guarantee of
an algorithm that aims to maximize ρ(S), in Section IV-B.
Now the above worst-case objective function ensures that
our approach works well even for aggregation rules such
as random dictatorship. However, such extreme aggregation
rules are seldom used in real-world scenarios; hence, another
surrogate objective function, representing average expected
similarity, or equivalently sum of expected similarities, is
ψ(S) =
∑
i∈N
c(S, i) (8)
We will look into the desirable properties of an algorithm that
aims to maximize ψ(S), in Section IV-C.
We now turn towards the problem of maximizing the above
two surrogate objective functions.
Proposition 1. Given constants χ and ω,
(a) it is NP-hard to determine whether there exists a set M
consisting of k nodes such that ρ(M) ≥ χ, and
(b) it is NP-hard to determine whether there exists a set M
consisting of k nodes such that ψ(M) ≥ ω.
We provide a proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix B. A
function h(·) is said to be submodular if, for all v ∈ N \ T
and for all S, T such that S ⊂ T ⊂ N ,
h(S ∪ {v})− h(S) ≥ h(T ∪ {v})− h(T )
Proposition 2. The objective functions ρ(·) and ψ(·) are non-
negative, monotone increasing, and submodular.
We provide a proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix C. For
a non-negative, monotone increasing, and submodular func-
tion, the greedy hill-climbing algorithm (selecting elements
one at a time, each time choosing an element that provides
the largest marginal increase in the function value), gives a
(1 − 1e ) ≈ 0.63-approximation to the optimal solution [22].
As the considered objective functions in Equations (7) and
(8) satisfy these properties, we use the greedy hill-climbing
algorithm to obtain a good approximation to the optimal
solution. Moreover, as desired, the functions are agnostic to
the aggregation rule being used.
We next devise algorithms for finding a representative set,
present their performance with the aid of extensive experimen-
tation, and provide detailed analysis of the results.
IV. SELECTION OF THE REPRESENTATIVE SET:
ALGORITHMS AND PERFORMANCE
Recall that the preference profile of N is P , that of M is
Q, and that obtained by replacing every node’s preference in
P by that of its uniquely chosen representative in M , is Q′.
Given the number of nodes to be selected k, our objective is to
find a set M of size k such that E[f(P ) ∆ f(R)] is minimized,
where R = Q′ or Q depending on the algorithm.
A. Algorithms for Finding Representatives
We now describe the algorithms we consider in our study.
• Greedy-orig (Greedy hill-climbing for maximizing 1 −
E[f(P ) ∆ f(Q′)]): Initialize M to {}. Until |M | = k,
choose a node j ∈ N \M that minimizes the expected error
or equivalently, maximizes 1 − E[f(P ) ∆ f(Q′M )], where
Q′M is the preference profile obtained by replacing every
node’s preference in P by the preference of its uniquely
chosen representative in M . Note that the optimal set would
depend on the aggregation rule f . Its time complexity for
obtaining M and hence R is O(knTf ), where Tf is the time
complexity of obtaining an aggregate preference using the
aggregation rule f . For instance, Tf is O(rn) for plurality,
O(1) for dictatorship.
• Greedy-sum (Greedy hill-climbing for maximizing ψ(·)):
Initialize M to {}. Until |M | = k, choose a node j ∈ N\M
that maximizes ψ(M ∪{j})−ψ(M). Then obtain f(R) =
f(Q′). If the similarity matrix is known, its time complexity
for obtaining M and hence R is O(kn2). If the similarity
matrix is unknown, the time complexity for deriving it is
largely decided by the model used for deducing the mean
distances between all pairs of nodes.
• Greedy-min (Greedy hill-climbing for maximizing ρ(·)):
Similar to Greedy-sum, with ρ(·) instead of ψ(·).
• Between-cen (Betweenness centrality heuristic): Choose k
nodes having the maximum values of Freeman’s between-
ness centrality (edge weights being dissimilarities). Then
obtain f(R) = f(Q). Its time complexity for obtaining M
is O(nm+ n2 log n).
• Degree-cen (Degree centrality heuristic): Choose k nodes
having the maximum weighted degrees (edge weights being
similarities). Then obtain f(R) = f(Q). Its time complex-
ity for obtaining M is O(nk + n log n).
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• Random-poll (Random polling): Choose k nodes uniformly
at random. Then obtain f(R) = f(Q). It is an important
baseline, since it is the most employed method in practice.
Also, it has been claimed in the literature that it is optimal
to ignore the social network [12] and that random node
selection performs well in practice [17].
• Other centrality measures (PageRank, Katz, eigenvector):
In a weighted network like the one under study, the sum of
weights of edges adjacent on a node could exceed 1. So the
edge weights are required to be attenuated for computing
these measures. For instance, while employing PageRank,
the edges need to be converted to directed edges [23]
(perhaps by adding self loops as well) and reweighed so
that the outgoing edge weights from any node, sum to 1.
Katz centrality involves a parameter α which is required to
be less than the reciprocal of the largest eigenvalue of the
weighted adjacency matrix, thus effectively reweighing the
weights of the walks.
In all algorithms, the time complexity of computing f(R)
depends on the aggregation rule f . For dictatorship, if the
dictator is not in M , Random-poll outputs the preference of
a node in M chosen uniformly at random, else it outputs the
dictator’s preference; other algorithms output the preference of
the dictator’s representative in M . We now present desirable
properties of Greedy-min and Greedy-sum algorithms.
B. Performance Guarantee for Greedy-min Algorithm
Here, we show the performance guarantee of Greedy-min.
Theorem 1. For an aggregation rule satisfying expected
weak insensitivity, the error incurred in using the aggregate
preference given by the Greedy-min algorithm instead of the
actual aggregate preference, is at most
(
1− (1− 1e) ρ∗),
where ρ∗ = maxS⊆N,|S|≤k ρ(S).
Proof. Let SG be a set obtained using greedy hill-climbing
algorithm for maximizing ρ(·). Since greedy hill-climbing
provides a
(
1− 1e
)
-approximation to the optimal solution, we
have
ρ(SG) = min
i∈N
c(SG, i) ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
ρ∗
=⇒ 1−max
i∈N
d(SG, i) ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
ρ∗
=⇒ max
i∈N
d(SG, i) ≤ 1−
(
1− 1
e
)
ρ∗
=⇒ d(SG, i) ≤ 1−
(
1− 1
e
)
ρ∗, ∀i ∈ N
For an aggregation rule satisfying expected weak insensi-
tivity property, from Lemma 1, when the representative set
M = SG, we have E[f(P ) ∆ f(Q′)] ≤ 1− (1− 1e) ρ∗.
It is to be noted that, though the approximation ratio given
by the greedy algorithm is modest in theory, it has been
observed in several domains that its performance is close to
optimal in practice when it comes to optimizing non-negative,
monotone increasing, submodular functions.
C. A Cooperative Game Theoretic Viewpoint of Greedy-sum
Algorithm
Shapley value is known to act as a good measure for
node selection problems in social networks, particularly that
of influence maximization [24], [25]. We have seen that,
to maximize the objective function ψ(S) =
∑
i∈N c(S, i),
the greedy hill-climbing algorithm first chooses a node j
that maximizes
∑
i∈N c(i, j) or equivalently
∑
i∈N,i6=j c(i, j)
(since c(j, j) = 1,∀j). It has been shown in [26] that∑
i∈N,i6=j c(i, j) is the Shapley value of player j, in a convex
Transferable Utility (TU) game (N, ν) with the characteristic
function ν(S) =
∑
i,j∈S,i 6=j c(i, j). This characteristic func-
tion can be viewed as an indication of how tightly knit a group
is, or how similar the members of a set S are to each other.
Let φ(ν), Nu(ν), Gv(ν), τ(ν) be Shapley value, Nucleolus,
Gately point, τ -value of the TU game (N, ν).
Theorem 2. For the TU game defined by ν(S) =∑
i,j∈S,i 6=j c(i, j), φ(ν) = Nu(ν) = Gv(ν) = τ(ν).
We provide a proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix D. So
the Greedy-sum algorithm aims to maximize a term that is
unanimously suggested by several solution concepts for a TU
game capturing the similarities within a set. In other words,
the solution concepts unanimously suggest that the first node
chosen by the Greedy-sum algorithm, is on average most
similar to different subsets of the population.
D. Experimental Observations
After obtaining the representative set using the aforemen-
tioned algorithms, we tested their performance on T = 104
topics or preference profiles generated using the RPM-S model
(with the assigned neighbor chosen in a random way) on
our Facebook data. Owing to the nature of the Random-poll
algorithm, we ran it sufficient number of times to get an
independent representative set each time, and then defined the
performance as the average over all the runs. The values of
E[f(P ) ∆ f(R)] were computed using extensive simulations
with the considered aggregation rules.
We observed that for any node i, in all algorithms except
Random-poll, the candidate set arg minj∈S d(j, i) (see Equa-
tion (4)) was a singleton for low values of k. For higher values
of k (higher than 7), the number of candidates were usually
less than or equal to 4, with a maximum of 10 for k = 50
in one instance. We thus ran the experiments several times;
we observed that changes in the error plots were not very
significant. Also, the aggregate preferences f(P ) and f(R)
both consisted of one preference in almost all the runs, so the
error E[f(P ) ∆ f(R)] was equivalent to Kendall-Tau distance
between the actual aggregate preference and the obtained
aggregate preference (see Equation (5)).
Figure 4(a) shows the plots for the worst case of Random
Dictatorship, that is, when the randomly chosen dictator is the
most dissimilar to the chosen representative set. Greedy-min
performed the best owing to it ensuring that no node in the
network is very dissimilar to the chosen representative set. The
error for Greedy-orig could not be plotted since the objective
function cannot be computed in this case.
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Fig. 3. Comparison among algorithms for Plurality aggregation rule
The plots for all non-dictatorial aggregation rules were
similar (albeit with different scaling) to the ones plotted in
Figure 3. Our key observations are as follows:
• Performance of Greedy-orig. Greedy-orig performed the
best throughout, however it had unacceptably high running
time (order of days) even for computationally fast aggrega-
tion rules such as plurality; so it is practically infeasible to
run this algorithm for computationally intensive rules, for
example, Kemeny.
• Performance of Greedy-sum. Greedy-sum performed very
well; but its plots displayed non-monotonicity especially in
the lower range of k, and so a higher k might not always
lead to a better result. Greedy-sum, with MSM-SP as a
precursor, attempts to find nodes which are closest to other
nodes on average, where closeness is based on the similarity
deduced using adaptation of the shortest path algorithm
(as described in Section II-C5). This is on similar lines as
finding influential nodes for diffusing information, which
would lead to other nodes being influenced with maximum
probabilities on average.
• Performance of Greedy-min. Greedy-min performed bet-
ter than Random-poll for low values of k; this difference
in performance decreased for higher values of k. The effect
of satisfaction or otherwise of expected weak insensitivity
was not very prominent, because the property is not violated
by an appreciable enough margin for any aggregation rule.
Nonetheless, the expected weak insensitivity property does
provide a guarantee on the performance of Greedy-min for
an aggregation rule.
• Performance of Random-poll. As mentioned earlier, the
performance of Random-poll is based on an average over
several runs; the variance in performance was very high
for low values of k, and the worst case performance was
unacceptable. The variance was acceptable for higher values
of k. One reason for its performance being not very bad on
average could be the low standard deviation of the mean
distances (see Section II-B).
• Performance of Between-cen. Between-cen lagged behind
Greedy-sum when the size of the representative set was
small. However, it performed at par with or at times better
when the size of the representative set was moderate to high.
Both Between-cen and Greedy-sum are based on the idea
of shortest paths, albeit with different additive operators
(simple addition in case of Between-cen versus MSM-SP in
case of Greedy-sum) and with the difference that Between-
cen concerns intermediary nodes and Greedy-sum concerns
end nodes.
• Performance of Degree-cen. Degree-cen showed a per-
fect balance between performance and running time. This
demonstrates that high degree nodes indeed serve as good
representatives of the population.
• Performance of other centrality measures. Centrality
measures (not included in the plots) such as Katz and
eigenvector (belonging to the Bonanich family) as well
as PageRank performed almost at par with Between-cen
for most values of k. Katz and eigenvector centralities,
in particular, selected representative nodes which often
were neighbors of each other; this is intuitively undesirable
for the problem of sampling representatives which should
ideally represent different parts of the network. Also, as
discussed earlier, these measures reweigh edges, which may
be detrimental to their performance.
• Non-monotonicity of error plots. The error plot need not
be monotone decreasing with the representative set, that
is, adding a node to a representative set need not reduce
the error. For example, let s1 be the selected representative
node for k = 1, and s2 be the node added when k = 2.
If we aggregate preferences of the representative nodes in
an unweighted way, it is clear that if s1 is truly a good
representative of almost the entire population and s2 is a
good representative of only a section of the population,
weighing their preferences equally (R = Q) would lead
to more error than considering s1 alone (with k = 1).
This is precisely the reason why we employed the method
of weighing their preferences differently while aggregating
their preferences. Weighing their preferences proportional
to the number of nodes they represent (R = Q′) based on
the deduced similarity matrix, was used as only a heuristic
and so does not guarantee that the error would reduce with
an increasing k.
• Role of social network. We observe that algorithms which
consider the underlying social network perform better than
random polling, implying that the network plays a role and
should be considered while determining representatives. We
next provide a more detailed insight.
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Fig. 4. Comparison among algorithms under other settings
E. Personal versus Social Topics
We have focused on aggregating preferences across all
topics, without classifying them into different types. Now, we
provide a preliminary analysis of personal versus social type
of topics. It is to be noted that the model fitting (as discussed
in Section II-B) was employed based on only four topics of
each type that were available from our Facebook data. So
the obtained results (Figures 4(b-c)) are provided with low
confidence, but have qualitative implications.
All the algorithms showed relatively low errors for social
topics. Random-poll performed very well on average for
sufficiently high values of k. This could be attributed to a
lower average mean distance for social topics (0.30), resulting
in nodes being more similar to each other; so nodes chosen
at random are likely to be more similar to most other nodes.
However, it performed badly while aggregating preferences
with respect to personal topics, which has a higher standard
deviation (0.12) and also a higher average mean distance
(0.40). Also, the variance in performance of Random-poll was
unacceptably high for lower values of k, but acceptable for
higher values. So though the usage of Random-poll seems
undesirable in general, it is justified for social topics with a
reasonable sample size.
A high level of similarity between unconnected nodes with
respect to social topics could be attributed to the impact of
news and other common channels. It may also be justified
by a theory of political communication [27] which stresses
the importance of citizen discussion beyond the boundaries of
cohesive groups for the dissemination of public opinion.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper focused on two subproblems with respect to
preference aggregation in social networks, namely, (a) how
preferences are spread and (b) how to determine the best
set of representative nodes. We started by motivating both
these problems. Based on our Facebook dataset, we developed
a number of simple and natural models, of which RPM-S
showed a good balance between accuracy and running time;
while MSM-SP was observed to be the best model when our
objective was to deduce the mean distances between all pairs
of nodes, and not the preferences themselves.
We formulated an objective function for representative-set
selection and followed it up with two surrogate objective
functions for practical usage. We then proposed algorithms
for selecting best representatives, wherein we provided a
guarantee on the performance of the Greedy-min algorithm,
subject to the aggregation rule satisfying the expected weak
insensitivity property; we also studied the desirable properties
of the Greedy-sum algorithm. We also observed that degree
centrality heuristic performed very well, thus showing the
ability of high-degree nodes to serve as good representatives
of the population. Our preliminary analysis also suggested that
selecting representatives based on social network is advanta-
geous for aggregating preferences related to personal topics,
while random polling with a reasonable sample size is good
enough for aggregating preferences related to social topics.
A. Future Work
It is intuitive that the network structure would affect the ease
of sampling best representatives and how well they represent
the population. For instance, a tightly-knit network would
likely consist of nodes with similar preferences, thus requiring
a small number of representatives, while a sparse network
would require a higher number. A network with a larger
diameter also would require a higher number of representatives
distributed across the network. For a network in which there
exist natural communities, we could have representatives from
each community and the number of representatives from a
community would depend on the size of the community. In
general, a good representative set would consist of nodes
distributed over the network, so that they represent different
sections of the network. Hence it would be interesting to study
how the network structure influences the ease of determining
representative set and its effectiveness.
Network compression techniques could be considered for
solving the studied problem; the preferences with respect
to a number of topics over their sets of alternatives, could
be viewed as constituting the state of a node. Some of the
relevant techniques that could be useful are efficient data
representations for large high-dimensional data [28] using
spectral graph theory and graph Laplacian [29], multiple
transforms for data indexed by graphs [30], etc. Furthermore,
with the emergence of online social networks, it is possible to
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obtain detailed attributes and interests of a node based on its
public profile, liked pages, followed events and personalities,
shared posts, etc. Network compression techniques could be
used for arriving at a concise set of attributes and nodes, for
representing network data.
We believe the expected weak insensitivity property intro-
duced in this paper, could be of interest to the social choice
theory community and has a scope of further study. It will also
be interesting to study how one should weigh the preferences
of the nodes in a representative set, so that the error is a
monotone decreasing function of the set. One could consider
the scenario when nodes are strategic while reporting their
preferences. Alternative models for the spread of preferences
in a network, given the edge similarities, could be studied.
Considering the attributes of nodes and alternatives [20] in
addition to the underlying social network for determining the
best representatives, is another direction worth exploring.
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APPENDIX A
DESCRIPTION OF THE FACEBOOK APP
A. Overview
Online social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter,
and Google+ are highly popular in the current age; for
instance, Facebook has over 2 billion monthly active users
as of 2017. Using such online social networking sites for data
collection has become a trend in several research domains.
When given permission by a user, it is easy to obtain access to
the user’s friend list, birthday, public profile, and other relevant
information using Facebook APIs. Furthermore, Facebook
provides a facility to its users to invite their friends to use any
particular application, and hence propagate it. Owing to these
reasons, in order to obtain the data for our purpose, we de-
veloped a Facebook application titled The Perfect Representer
for eliciting the preferences of users over a set of alternatives
for a wide range of topics, as well as to obtain the underlying
social network. Once a user logged into the app, the welcome
page as shown in Figure 5 was presented, which described to
the user what was to be expected from the app.
First, the user would have to give his/her preferences over
5 alternatives for 8 topics, using a drag‘n’drop interface as
shown in Figure 6. The user was given the option of skipping
any particular topic if he/she wished to. The topics, which
were broadly classified into personal and social types, and their
alternatives are listed in Table VI (the ordering of alternatives
from top to bottom is based on the aggregate preference
computed from our data as per the Borda count aggregation
rule). From a user’s viewpoint, the app gave the user a social
centrality score out of 10, telling how well the user represents
the society or how well the user’s opinions are aligned with
that of the society with respect to the provided preferences.
The score was dynamic and kept on updating as more users
used the app (since the aggregate preference itself kept on
updating); this score could be posted on the user’s timeline.
The user also had an option of viewing how similar his/her
preferences were to his/her selected friends. Explicit incentives
were provided for users to propagate the app either by inviting
their friends or sharing on their timelines as well as messaging
through emails and popular websites (Figure 7).
To host our application, we used Google App Engine, which
provides a Cloud platform for facilitating large number of hits
at any given time as well as large and fast storage.
B. The Scores
Let A be the set of alternatives and r = |A|. Let c˜(p, q)
be the similarity between preferences p and q. In our app, we
implement c˜(p, q) to be the normalized Footrule similarity as
a computationally efficient approximation [32] to normalized
Kendall-Tau similarity (which is used throughout our study)
for scoring the users in real-time; the normalized Kendall-Tau
similarities are computed offline. Let wpa denote the position
of alternative a in preference p. The Footrule distance between
preferences p and q is given by
∑
a∈A |wpa−wqa|. With r being
the number of alternatives, it can be shown that the maximum
possible Footrule distance is 2d r2eb r2c. So the normalized
Fig. 5. Screenshot of the welcome page
Fig. 6. Screenshot of a page with topics and their alternatives
Footrule distance between preferences p and q can be given
by
d˜(p, q) =
∑
a∈A |wpa − wqa|
2d r2eb r2c
and normalized Footrule similarity by c˜(p, q) = 1− d˜(p, q).
For example, the normalized Footrule similarity between
preferences p = (A,B,C,D,E) and q = (B,E,C,A,D) is
c˜(p, q) =
(
1− |1−4|+|2−1|+|3−3|+|4−5|+|5−2|
2d 52 eb 52 c
)
= 13 .
1) Social Centrality Score - How Perfectly you Represent
the Society?: Let pit be the preference of node i for topic
t, and pAt be the aggregate preference of the population for
topic t. For the purpose of our app’s implementation, we
obtain the aggregate preference using the Borda count rule.
For computing the social centrality, we give each topic t, a
weight proportional to nt (the number of users who have given
their responses for that topic). So the fractional score of user
i is given by
∑
t
(
nt∑
t nt
)
c˜(pit, pAt).
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TABLE VI
TOPICS AND ALTERNATIVES IN THE FACEBOOK APP
Personal Social
Hangout Chatting Facebook Lifestyle Website Government Serious Leader
Place App Activity visited Investment Crime
Friend’s place WhatsApp Viewing Posts Intellectual Google Education Rape N. Modi (India)
Adventure Park Facebook Chatting Exercising Facebook Agriculture Terrorism B. Obama (USA)
Trekking Hangouts Posting Social activist Youtube Infrastructure Murder D. Cameron (UK)
Mall SMS Games/Apps Lavish Wikipedia Military Corruption V. Putin (Russia)
Historical Place Skype Marketing Smoking Amazon Space explore Extortion X. Jinping (China)
Fig. 7. Screenshot of the sharing and scoring page
A primary drawback of standard measures such as Kendall-
Tau or Footrule distance is the way distances between prefer-
ences themselves are distributed. For instance, there are several
preferences which are at a distance of, say 0.5, from a given
preference as compared to those at a distance of, say 0.3,
which leads to a bias in distances to be concentrated in the in-
termediate range. Since the distance between two preferences
(here, user preference and the aggregate preference) for most
topics would be concentrated in the intermediate range, a user
would seldom get a very high or a very low score. A mediocre
score would, in some sense, act as a hurdle in the way of user
sharing the post on his/her timeline. So to promote posting
their scores, we used a simple boosting rule (square root) and
then enhanced it to the nearest multiple of 0.5, resulting in the
final score of
1
2
⌈
20
√∑
t
(
nt∑
t nt
)
c˜(pit, pAt)
⌉
(out of 10).
2) How Perfectly you Represent your Friends?: Once a
user selected a list of friends to see how similar they are to
the user, the app would give the similarity for each friend in
terms of percentage. This similarity was also a function of
the number of common questions they responded to. So the
similarity between nodes i and j in terms of percentage was
given by
100
(∑
t c˜(pit, pjt)∑
t 1
)
where c˜(pit, pjt) = 0 if either i or j or both did not respond
to topic t.
C. The Incentive Scheme
A typical active Facebook user uses several apps in a given
span of time, and invites his/her friends to use it depending
on the nature of the app and the benefits involved. In order to
ensure a larger reach, it was important to highlight the benefits
of propagating our app. We achieved this by designing a
simple yet effective incentive scheme for encouraging users to
propagate the app by sharing it on their timelines and inviting
their friends to use it.
We incorporated a points system in our app, where suitable
points were awarded on a daily, weekly, as well as on an
overall basis, for spreading the word about the app through
shares, invites, likes, etc. Bonus points were awarded when a
referred friend used the app through the link shared by the
user. To ensure competitiveness in sharing and inviting, the
daily and weekly ‘top 10’ point collectors were updated in
real-time and the winners were declared at 12 noon GMT
(daily) and Mondays 12 noon GMT (weekly). A cutoff was
set on the number of points to be eligible to get a prize. Users
were also given a chance to win a big prize through daily,
weekly, and bumper lucky draws, if they crossed a certain
amount of points, so that users with less number of friends
could also put their effort even though they did not have a
chance to make it into the ‘top 10’. Prizes were awarded in
the form of gift coupons so that getting the prize was in itself,
quick as well as hassle-free for the users.
The points structure as well as the links to invite, like, and
share were provided on the scoring page (Figure 7), giving
the users a clear picture of how to earn points and win prizes.
The lists of daily and weekly winners were displayed on the
welcome page and the scoring page.
D. Preprocessing of the Obtained Dataset
The obtained dataset consisted of 1006 nodes and 7112
edges. Figure 8 shows the network of app users and Table
VII shows some user statistics. It was necessary to preprocess
the data before using it for model-fitting. For instance, we
eliminated nodes which provided responses to fewer than 6
topics so as to consider only those nodes which responded to
sufficient number of topics. Further, in order to observe the
network effect, it was necessary that all nodes belonged to the
same component; so we considered only the giant component
which consisted of 844 nodes and 6129 edges.
The obtained network is a subgraph of nodes who have
used the Facebook app to give their preferences for the asked
topics. The users had the option of inviting their friends to
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Fig. 8. Network of the app users
TABLE VII
APP USER STATISTICS
Attribute Value Count
Age
13-18 25
19-21 120
22-24 291
25-28 272
29-32 58
33-40 37
41-50 14
51-70 12
Indeterminate 15
Location
North America 44
Europe 18
Middle east 12
India 749
East Asia 8
Australia 5
Indeterminate 8
Gender
Male 565
Female 269
Indeterminate 10
use the app and sharing their app social centrality scores on
their timelines, and were provided incentives for the same.
It is well known that users generally use an app suggested
by their close friends and also invite their close friends to
use an app. Similarly, the social centrality posts shared by
users are more likely to be viewed and clicked on by their
close friends. We observed that connected nodes had mean
dissimilarity (= avg (i,j)∈E d(i, j)) of 0.24 and unconnected
nodes had mean dissimilarity of 0.37. Due to the way that the
app usage is propagated, it is likely for most nodes to have
their close friends included in the network. This is an intuition
behind the observed homophily in the obtained network.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proposition 1. Given constants χ and ω,
(a) it is NP-hard to determine whether there exists a set M
consisting of k nodes such that ρ(M) ≥ χ, and
(b) it is NP-hard to determine whether there exists a set M
consisting of k nodes such that ψ(M) ≥ ω.
Proof. We reduce an NP-hard Dominating Set problem in-
stance to the problem under consideration. Given a graph G of
n vertices, the dominating set problem is to determine whether
there exists a set D of k vertices such that every vertex not
in D, is adjacent to at least one vertex in D.
Given a dominating set problem instance, we can construct
a weighted undirected complete graph H consisting of the
same set of vertices as G such that, the weight c(i, j) of an
edge (i, j) in H is some high value (say 0.9) if there is edge
(i, j) in G, else it is some low value (say 0.6).
Now there exists a set D of k vertices in G such that the
distance between any vertex in G and any vertex in D is at
most one, if and only if there exists a set M of k vertices in
H such that ρ(M) ≥ 0.9 or ψ(M) ≥ k + 0.9(n − k). Here
χ = 0.9 and ω = k + 0.9(n − k). This shows that the NP-
hard dominating set problem is a special case of the problems
under consideration, hence the result.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proposition 2. The objective functions ρ(·) and ψ(·) are non-
negative, monotone, and submodular.
Proof. We prove the properties in detail for ψ(·). The proof
for ρ(·) is similar.
Consider sets S, T such that S ⊂ T ⊂ N and a node
v ∈ N \ T . It is clear that ψ(·) is non-negative. Let xi =
c(S, i), yi = c(T, i), x¯i = c(S ∪ {v}, i), y¯i = c(T ∪ {v}, i).
For any i ∈ N ,
c(S, i) = max
j∈S⊆T
c(j, i) ≤ max
j∈T
c(j, i) = c(T, i)
=⇒ xi ≤ yi (9)
That is, ψ(·) is monotone. Similarly, it can be shown that
x¯i ≤ y¯i ; xi ≤ x¯i ; yi ≤ y¯i (10)
Now, yi < y¯i =⇒ k /∈ arg max
j∈T∪{v}
c(j, i) ∀k ∈ T (11)
=⇒ k /∈ arg max
j∈S∪{v}
c(j, i) ∀k ∈ S ⊆ T (12)
=⇒ xi < x¯i (13)
The contrapositive of the above, from Inequalities (10) is
xi = x¯i =⇒ yi = y¯i (14)
Also, from Implications (11) and (12),
yi < y¯i =⇒ {v} = arg max
j∈T∪{v}
c(j, i) = arg max
j∈S∪{v}
c(j, i)
=⇒ x¯i = y¯i (15)
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Now from Inequalities (10), depending on node i, four cases
arise that relate the values of x¯i − xi and y¯i − yi.
Case 1:xi = x¯i and yi = y¯i:
In case of such an i, we have x¯i − xi = y¯i − yi
Case 2:xi = x¯i and yi < y¯i:
By Implication (14), there does not exist such an i.
Case 3:xi < x¯i and yi = y¯i:
In case of such an i, we have x¯i − xi > y¯i − yi
Case 4:xi < x¯i and yi < y¯i: For such an i,
x¯i − xi = y¯i − xi (from (13) and (15))
≥ y¯i − yi (from Inequality (9))
From the above cases, we have
x¯i − xi ≥ y¯i − yi, ∀i ∈ N
=⇒
∑
i∈N
(x¯i − xi) ≥
∑
i∈N
(y¯i − yi)
=⇒
∑
i∈N
x¯i −
∑
i∈N
xi ≥
∑
i∈N
y¯i −
∑
i∈N
yi
=⇒ ψ(S ∪ {v})− ψ(S) ≥ ψ(T ∪ {v})− ψ(T )
As the proof is valid for any v ∈ N \ T and for any S, T
such that S ⊂ T ⊂ N , the result is proved.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Theorem 2. For the TU game defined by ν(S) =∑
i,j∈S
i 6=j
c(i, j), φ(ν) = Nu(ν) = Gv(ν) = τ(ν).
Proof. The characteristic function ν(S) =
∑
i,j∈S
i6=j
c(i, j),
when |S| = 2 where S = {i, j},
ν({i, j}) = c(i, j) (16)
∴ ν(S) =
∑
T⊆N
|T |=2
ν(T ) (17)
From Equation (16), the Shapley value can be rewritten as
φj(ν) =
1
2
∑
i∈N
i 6=j
c(i, j) =
1
2
∑
i∈N
i 6=j
ν({i, j}) = 1
2
∑
S⊆N
j∈S
|S|=2
ν(S) (18)
The proof for φ(ν) = Nu(ν) follows from [33]. Fur-
thermore, it has been shown in [33] that, for the TU game
satisfying Equation (18), for each S ⊆ N ,
ν(S)−
∑
i∈S
φi(ν) = ν(N\S)−
∑
i∈N\S
φi(ν)
∴ ν({i})− φi(ν) = ν(N\{i})−
∑
j∈N
j 6=i
φj(ν) , for S = {i}
So, the propensity to disrupt for player i [34] for the Shapley
value allocation is
di(φ(ν)) =
∑
j∈N,j 6=i φj(ν)− ν(N\{i})
φi(ν)− ν({i}) = 1
As the propensity to disrupt is equal for all the players (= 1),
this allocation is the Gately point [34], that is, φ(ν) = Gv(ν).
Let M(ν) = (Mi(ν))i∈N and m(ν) = (mi(ν))i∈N , where
Mi(ν) = ν(N)−ν(N\{i}) and mi(ν) = ν({i}). For a convex
game, τ(ν) = λM(ν) + (1 − λ)m(ν), where λ ∈ [0, 1] is
chosen such that [33],∑
i∈N
[λMi(ν) + (1− λ)mi(ν)] = ν(N) (19)
From (17), Mi(ν) =
∑
S⊆N
|S|=2
ν(S)−
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|=2
ν(S) =
∑
S⊆N
i∈S
|S|=2
ν(S)
This, with Equation (19) and the fact that for our game, for
all i, mi(ν) = ν({i}) = 0,
ν(N) = λ
∑
i∈N
Mi(ν) = λ
∑
i∈N
∑
S⊆N
i∈S
|S|=2
ν(S) = 2λ
∑
S⊆N
|S|=2
ν(S)
Using Equation (17), we get λ = 12 . So we have
τi(ν) =
1
2
Mi(ν) +
1
2
mi(ν) =
1
2
∑
S⊆N
i∈S
|S|=2
ν(S)
This, with Equation (18), gives φ(ν) = τ(ν)
